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REFORMING AMERICA'S MORTGAGE MARKET:
WHAT COMES AFTER FANNIE MAE AND
FREDDIE MAC?
REGINALD T. O'SHIELDS *
I. INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2008, now commonly referred to
as the Great Recession, had its origins in the United States housing and
mortgage market.' What began in early 2007 as a mild and ostensibly
isolated disturbance among unregulated, non-bank mortgage lenders,
such as American Home Mortgage and New Century Financial, quickly
spread to mortgage-focused banks, such as Countrywide, Washington
Mutual, and IndyMac. The crisis then migrated to major investment
banks with large exposures to the residential real estate market, and in
early September 2008, the largest participants in the U.S. housing
market, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), collapsed. The
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency of
the U.S. government, announced that it was placing the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) into government
conservatorship. 2
With the conservatorship, the FHFA dismissed the executive
management and the boards of directors of the two companies and
assumed control of their operations. Throughout the conservatorship,
* Mr. O'Shields is Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Atlanta. The views expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do
not reflect the views or positions of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, the Federal
Home Loan Bank system, or any director, officer, or other employee of any of the
foregoing.
1. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE U.S. xvi, 23 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
2. A conservatorship is a structure whereby the conservator acts to preserve the assets
of the corporation until a final resolution of the enterprise is determined. See 12 U.S.C. §
4617 (2006).
3. Zachary Goldfarb, FHFA Appoints New Fannie and Freddie Chairmen, WASH.
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the U.S. Treasury has provided financial support to the companies in the
form of senior preferred stock purchases that give the Treasury the
option to purchase 79.9% of their common equity, which has effectively
eliminated the interests of the common and other preferred shareholders
of the companies.4 With these actions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have ceased to be privately-owned and -managed corporations and are
the largest corporate casualties of the housing market meltdown.
Although the global financial crisis would later claim other large
financial entities, such as Lehman Brothers and the insurance giant
AIG, the demise of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remains the most
expensive failure of the financial crisis in terms of cost to U.S.
taxpayers. The U.S. government has injected over $150 billion into the
two companies, and the final cost of the rescue to the American
taxpayers is estimated by the FHFA to be as high as almost $200
billion.
Despite its large cost, the actions of the FHFA and the Treasury
effectively stabilized the U.S. mortgage market and kept it functioning
throughout the financial crisis and into the current period.6 Today,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, along with other government entities,
account for nearly all new mortgage credit in the United States.
POST, Sept. 17, 2008, at D07.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: TREASURY
SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/pspa factsheet_090708%20.pdf. The U.S. Treasury purchases senior
preferred stock in the companies each quarter in the amount necessary to remedy any
shortfalls in the companies' solvency. Originally, there was a $200 billion per institution
limit on the amount of preferred stock purchases by the U.S. Treasury, but those limitations
were removed by the Treasury on December 24, 2009.
5. Lorraine Woellert, Freddie Mac Swings to Loss, Seeks $1.5 billion in Aid,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-
08/freddie-mac-swings-to-loss-seeks-1-5-billion-in-treasury-aid.html; Kate Berry, Latest
Bailout an Underscore to Despair of GSEs, AM. BANKER, Nov. 10, 2011; see also FED.
Hous. FIN. AGENCY, PROJECTIONS OF THE ENTERPRISES' FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 3 (2011),
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22737/GSEProjF.pdf
6. While the U.S. housing market has continued to experience considerable distress,
the amount of mortgage lending has been commensurate with the level of home sales. This
is largely due to the ability of Fannie and Freddie to double their share of U.S. single-family
mortgage originations from approximately thirty percent of the market in 2006 to sixty
percent in 2010. See JOO-YUNG LEE & ROBERT GROSSMAN, FITCH RATINGS, U.S. HOUSING
REFORM PROPOSAL FAQs: FILLING THE VOID 3 fig.5 (2011), available at http://
http://hofinet.org/upload docs/FitchRatings USHousingReform Proposal FAQs.pdf.
The companies would not have been able to perform this function without the support that
they receive from the U.S. Treasury on a quarterly basis.
7. See Nick Timiraos, Government Stays Glued to Mortgage Market, WALL ST. J.,
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However, there is general agreement that the level of government
involvement in the mortgage market is not sustainable or advisable in
the long-term.8 The Acting Director of the FHFA has warned that the
length of the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is
unprecedented and raises serious concerns with regard to retention of
personnel and levels of capital investment at the companies.9
In 2011, there has been increasing interest from Congress in
reforming the U.S. mortgage market in the aftermath of the collapse of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and in establishing a more stable and
balanced structure going forward. The sources of capital for the U.S.
mortgage market can be likened to the three legs of the proverbial stool,
with each leg of the stool growing and shrinking over the years based on
external economic factors and government policy. The first leg of the
mortgage market stool is composed of government-backed entities, such
as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae), that purchase, guarantee or package into securities (or
"securitize") home mortgage loans.o The second leg is the private
securitization market that works essentially like the government
securitization market but without the credit guarantee from a
governmental entity." The final leg of the mortgage market stool is the
June 20, 2011, at A2, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304186404576389863819100854.html.
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING
FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2011) [hereinafter REFORMING AMERICA'S
HOUSING FINANCE MARKET], available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=housingfinmarketreform.pdf.
9. Private Mortgage Investment Act: Hearing on HR 3644 Before the H. Subcomm. on
the Capital Mts. and Gov't-Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. 1, 6 (2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22744/DeMarcoTestimonyl 132011 .pdf (statement of Edward
J. DeMarco, Acting Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency).
10. Each of the governmental entities has slightly different roles in the mortgage
finance market. Fannie and Freddie purchase, guarantee, and securitize home mortgage
loans. Ginnie Mae provides a guarantee to investors in mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
backed by loans insured by FHA and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). These MBS
are issued by private entities, unlike Fannie and Freddie MBS, which are issued by Fannie
and Freddie. See About Ginnie Mae, GrNNIEMAE.GOV,
http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/about.asp?Section=About (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
FHA insures loans made by approved lenders. FHA's underwriting criteria, historically, has
been more flexible than that of Fannie and Freddie, and typically requires lower down
payments. See The Federal Housing Administration, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEv., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program-offices/housing/fhahistory (last
visited Feb. 11, 2012).
11. Securitization of mortgage loans involves the sale of the mortgage loan made by a
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funding that facilitates financial institutions' ability to retain mortgage
loans on their balance sheets, such as bank deposits, advances from the
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), and other wholesale sources.
The U.S. mortgage market relied predominantly on this last
leg-deposits and FHLBank advances-through the 1970s but, since
that time, has increasingly relied on the securitization legs of the stool,
both governmental and private, to fund the origination of home
mortgage loans. 2 Currently, this reliance means that with the collapse
of the private securitization market during the financial crisis and the
reluctance of banks to lend, particularly against mortgage assets in an
uncertain real estate market, the U.S. mortgage market has been left to
depend almost entirely on the first leg of the stool-government-backed
purchases, credit guarantees, and securitization.
Most of the current Congressional proposals for housing finance
reform focus on fixing or improving only one leg of the mortgage
market stool. Some of the proposals would continue to focus on
government support for the housing market and establish new entities,
which could be government-owned or government-sponsored, to
perform the securitization functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(these proposals could be called "Fannie/Freddie 2.0"). Another series
of proposals would focus on restarting the private securitization market
but on a more stable and sustainable basis with stricter government
oversight of the origination of mortgage loans and their securitization
than occurred during the housing and securitization boom of the last
decade. Finally, the last set of proposals would provide alternative
avenues for banks and other lenders to finance residential mortgage
credit, such as covered bonds.
Part II of this note will give a brief history of the evolution of
mortgage finance in the United States, and then describe the principal
lender, called the originator, to a financial institution arranging, or sponsoring the
securitization (called the sponsor). The sponsor then sells the loan to a special purpose
entity that issues securities to investors backed by the loan. See Santiago Carbo-Valverde et
al., Are Covered Bonds a Substitute for Mortgage-Backed Securities 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Chi., Working Paper No. 2011-14, 2011), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/workingpapers/201 1/wp201 1_14.pd
f.
12. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SECURITIZATION AND
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current proposals for mortgage market reform.13 Part III will evaluate
each of these proposals against various goals implicit in historic U.S.
government policy towards housing and mortgage finance.14 Part IV
will conclude by advocating for a comprehensive solution to the
nation's housing finance crisis that draws upon a variety of elements in
the Congressional proposals. 5  The United States has the largest
housing market in the world. making it appropriate for its housing
finance policy to include a variety of mechanisms for connecting
homeowners with sources of capital.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. HOUSING FINANCE
A. The Aftermath of the Great Depression and the Creation of the
Current Mortgage Finance System
Prior to the financial reforms in the wake of the Great
Depression, most mortgage credit in the United States was short-term,
typically with balloon payments due at the end of three to five years
after origination of the loan.' 6 However, during the financial crisis of
the 1930s, many lenders were unable or unwilling to refinance these
mortgage loans when they came due, leading to the inability of
homeowners to obtain mortgage credit, elevated foreclosure rates and
impacting the homebuilding and other parts of the real economy.' 7 As a
result, the federal government took a number of important steps to
enhance the liquidity and stability of the mortgage finance market that
provide the basis for the mortgage market that has existed in the United
States through today.
In 1932, the federal government established the Federal Home
Loan Bank (FHLBank) system to provide a central credit facility for
home mortgage lenders to ensure the availability of home financing.' 8
The FHLBank system is composed of twelve regional banks owned
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON




18. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (2006).
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cooperatively by their member-shareholders of regulated financial
institutions and an Office of Finance that acts as the FHLBanks' fiscal
agent and debt issuance agent.' 9  Originally, savings and loan
associations, or "thrifts," composed the bulk of the FHLBanks'
membership, although insurance companies were also permitted within
the original membership base of the FHLBanks. In fact, thrifts were
required to become members of the FHLBanks. 20 The FHLBanks were
also delegated authority from their regulator, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, to supervise their members.2'
Over the ensuing years, Congress expanded the range of eligible
members of the FHLBanks to include commercial banks, credit unions,
and community development financial institutions. 22  Although each
FHLBank is independently owned and managed, the FHLBanks issue
their debt, known as consolidated obligations, on a joint and several
basis, which is not guaranteed by the U.S. government. 23  The funds
obtained through these debt issuances are then reloaned to the
FHLBanks' member institutions and used to support mortgage and
community lending in the United States. The borrowing financial
institution must secure its loans from the FHLBank with eligible
collateral as well as the capital stock purchased in the FHLBank. These
consist primarily of mortgage assets, such as home loans or mortgage-
19. Other than state and local housing finance authorities and agencies, only
shareholders of an FHLBank are authorized to borrow from the FHLBank and access the
FHLBank's other products and services. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1430, 1430b (2006). The FHLBanks
are cooperatives, in which the shareholder and customer base are the same. The FHLBanks
also possess the other primary attributes of a cooperative: (i) they are owned and controlled
by their customers; (ii) their primary focus is to provide their services to their shareholder-
customers, not the general public; (iii) they are democratically controlled by their
customers; and (iv) their primary purpose is to maximize the benefits to their shareholder-
customers, rather than to earn higher profits. See CHARLES T. AUTRY & ROLAND F. HALL,
THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 1 (2009).
20. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at C-1. Thrifts were required to remain
members of the FHLBanks until 1999 under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act § 604, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1451-52 (1999) (amending 12
U.S.C. § 1430 (1994)).
21. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at C-2.
22. Commercial banks were authorized to join the FHLBanks as part of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 714, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1988)). Community development
financial institutions were permitted to join as part of the Housing and Economic Reform
Act of 2008 (HERA). Housing and Economic Reform Act of 2008 § 1206, Pub. L. No. 110-
289, 122 Stat. 2654, 2787 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (2006)).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006).
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backed securities. 24  The FHLBanks' regulations also include other
requirements that ensure that they focus on support of mortgage lending
25as one of the FHLBanks' primary purposes. FHLBank advances can
be structured to include a variety of interest rate provisions that serve to
protect lenders from adverse movements in interest rates, thus
permitting these lenders to safely retain longer-term, fixed-rate
mortgage loans on their balance sheets.
The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) in order to encourage the origination of FHA-
insured, fully amortizing 30-year loans.26 The National Housing Act
also provided for the creation of national mortgage associations, and in
1938, Fannie Mae was created as a government agency.2 Fannie Mae's
initial purpose was to buy and sell mortgages insured by the FHA and,
starting in 1948, the Veterans Administration (VA) as well. Fannie Mae
did this with funds obtained through borrowings from the Treasury and
selling bonds. 28
In 1954, the National Housing Act was amended to provide for
separate charter authority for Fannie Mae.29 Under this new charter,
Fannie Mae's mission was broadened to include providing
supplementary liquidity to the private secondary market.30 Fannie Mae
was authorized to purchase, sell, and service FHA- and VA-insured
mortgages.31 Fannie Mae was also allowed to enter this activity through
the issuance of debt obligations that were no longer explicitly
guaranteed by the U.S. government. 32 The 1954 changes to Fannie
Mae's charter began the gradual transfer of ownership of the company
to the private sector by requiring mortgage sellers to purchase stock in
the company.3 3 In effect, Fannie Mae was converted from a direct
government agency into a private cooperative, similar to the FHLBanks.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1430 (2006).
25. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(3) (listing eligible collateral for FHLBank
advances); 12 U.S.C. § 1430(g) (requiring members of the FHLBanks to support first-time
homebuyers in order to access longer-term funding from the FHLBank).
26. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at A-2.
27. See id
28. Id. at A-3.
29. Id. at A-2.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b) (2006).
31. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at A-3.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1719(b) (2006).
33. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at A-3. Note this cooperative structure was
similar to the FHLBanks.
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Prior to 1970, mortgages were primarily funded through thrifts
and banks that held mortgage loans on their balance sheets. 34 These
mortgage purchases were funded primarily through a combination of
low-rate deposits and borrowings from the FHLBanks.35 This system
was known as an "originate-to-hold" model. This system operated with
lenders originating mortgage loans to hold on their balance sheets,
resulting in a very localized mortgage credit market with variation in
availability and terms within regions of the United States. 36 However, it
was also during this period that Americans saw the advent and
ascendancy of the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage as the primary mortgage
loan product in the United States. This structure was also supported by
strict government regulation of retail deposit rates, which, together with
access to fixed-rate advances from the FHLBanks, provided lenders,
particularly thrifts, with the ability to manage the interest rate risk
inherent in long-term, fixed-rate mortgage loans while earning attractive
returns from mortgage lending.37
B. The Beginnings of Securitization
With banking deregulation, dramatic shifts in interest rates, and
the thrift crisis, 38 the 1970s and 1980s saw the beginnings of the
transformation of the United States mortgage market from one based on
deposit and wholesale bank funding to one based on the capital markets
and securitization (i.e., an "originate-to-distribute" model).39 In 1968,
Congress passed legislation to reorganize Fannie Mae into a publicly-
traded, shareholder-owned corporation.40 A new government agency,
the Government National Mortgage Association (or Ginnie Mae), took
over Fannie Mae's role in financing FHA and VA mortgages, while
Fannie Mae retained its statutory mission to support the private
34. FCIC GSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. SUSAN M. HOFFMAN & MARK K. CASSELL, MISSION EXPANSION IN THE FEDERAL
HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM 45-49 (2010).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-782, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REVISING THE
HOUSING ENTERPRISES' LONG-TERM STRUCTURES 13 (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09782.pdf; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1716B (2006).
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secondary mortgage market. The 1968 legislation established Fannie
Mae's regulator within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), instead of as an independent regulator along the
lines of the banking regulators.4 1 The 1968 legislation also authorized
Fannie Mae to issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 4 2
In 1970, Congress created Freddie Mac and, at the same time,
authorized Fannie Mae to purchase "conventional" home mortgage
loans. "Conventional" home mortgages are mortgages deemed by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be of such quality, type, and class as to
primarily meet the purchase standards imposed by private institutional
mortgage investors.4 3 Generally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
restricted from purchasing loans with equity of less than twenty percent
(unless they were privately insured or otherwise credit enhanced) and
loans above a certain, annually indexed amount (what has come to be
known as the "conforming" loan limit). Today, that loan limit is
$417,000 in most areas and $625,500 in certain higher-cost markets.4 4
Freddie Mac was originally structured as a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the FHLBank System.4 5  Because the FHLBanks are
owned by their financial institution customers, Freddie Mac was also a
cooperative, owned and capitalized by the institutions that sold it
mortgage loans. In 1989, ownership of Freddie Mac was removed from
the FHLBank System, and the company became a publicly-traded
corporation.46 Its board of directors was reconstituted with eighteen
members, thirteen of whom were elected by the common shareholders
41. Id.
42. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at A-4.
43. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1719(a) (2006).
44. See Prashant Gopal & Jody Shenn, Banks May Soften Blow ofJumbo Loan Limits,
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-
28/banks-appetite-for-jumbos-may-soften-blow-of-new-loan-limits.html. The conforming
loan limit was temporarily raised to $729,750 in 2008 to support the housing market during
the financial crisis, but those temporary increases expired in October 2011. Id.
45. The 12 FHLBanks initially provided Freddie Mac with $100 million in original
capital and received 100,000 shares of nonvoting common stock in return. Freddie Mac's
board of directors consisted of members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which
oversaw the FHLBanks and were appointed by the President of the United States. In 1984,
Freddie Mac's board authorized a special dividend in the form of preferred stock to the
members of the FHLBanks in order to allow the mortgage lenders that owned the
FHLBanks to recognize the value of their indirect investment in Freddie Mac on their
financial statements. Trading was limited, however, only between members of the
FHLBanks until 1988, when such limitations on transferability of the preferred stock was
lifted. See TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 16, at B-1 to -9.
46. Id. at B-9.
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and five of whom were appointed by the President of the United
States.47
Freddie Mac shares with Fannie Mae the statutory duty to
provide stability in the secondary mortgage market.48 From the 1970s,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have financed their mortgage loan
purchases through a combination of issuances of MBS 49 and general
obligation bonds. These funds, in turn, are used to purchase mortgage
loans from lenders for packaging into MBS and to hold on the
companies' balance sheets, the latter holdings known as "retained
portfolios."50 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also occasionally purchase
their outstanding MBS and other mortgage assets as investments.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have always faced enormous
credit and interest rate risk from their operations. The credit risk is
from the guarantees they offer on MBS and from the purchases of
mortgage-related assets. The interest rate risk occurs because
conventional mortgages in the United States are generally pre-payable
at-will and without penalty by the homeowner. This means that
homeowners retain mortgages in environments with increasing interest
rates, while seeking to refinance in declining interest rate environments.
Thus, the duration on the mortgage loan assets extend and contract with
movements in interest rates. While these risks are not unique to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and are faced by most financial institutions that
make long-term, fixed-rate loans, they are exacerbated by the
companies' sole focus on the residential housing market. In the 1970s
and 1980s, Fannie Mae pursued a very different business strategy than
Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac focused its activities on purchasing home
loans and securitizing them into MBS for a fee paid by lenders (known
47. Id.atB-10.
48. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 16, at B-1.
49. MBS are mortgage-backed pass-through trust certificates representing undivided
beneficial interests in the underlying pools of mortgage loans or of other MBS. Agency
MBS are issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Importantly, until
recently, the pools of mortgage loans or MBS were not considered assets of the enterprises,
nor were the outstanding MBS issued by the two companies considered liabilities, i.e., they
were "off-balance-sheet" obligations. See id., at A-1. Under their guarantees, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac commit to make timely payments to investors of principal and interest on
the loans underlying the securities, even if the enterprises have not been paid by the
mortgage servicer that collects payments from the underlying borrowers. The purchase of
whole mortgage loans and issuance of MBS is a part of a process known as securitization.
50. See id at A-8.
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as a "guarantee fee" or "g-fee").5 ' Fannie Mae, on the other hand,
focused on purchasing mortgage loans and holding them as investments
in its portfolio. This was generally considered a higher-risk, but also
higher-return, business than securitization. 2 One possible reason for
Fannie Mae's decision to pursue a higher-risk strategy was the need to
satisfy higher return demands from public shareholders. Freddie Mac,
on the other hand, was operated under cooperative principles that
emphasized long-term shareholder value and access to its services by its
owner-customers. These divergent business strategies led Fannie Mae
into financial distress in the 1980s.54
C. The Growth in Mortgage Assets, 1990 and Beyond
In 1992, Congress determined that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
posed safety and soundness risks and passed the Federal Housing
Enterprises Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (1992 Act).ss The 1992
Act created the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) as an independent agency within HUD and established the
agency as the safety and soundness regulator for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. However, the 1992 Act failed to grant OFHEO many of
the authorities granted to federal banking regulators, such as the
authority to take enforcement actions based on declining capital and
unsound financial practices.56 OFHEO was also viewed by some
commentators as a small agency that lacked technical knowledge and
resources to effectively monitor the risk-taking activities of institutions
of the great size and complexity as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This
situation was not remedied until two months before the companies were
placed into conservatorship with the creation of the FHFA, which
enjoys enhanced prudential powers as compared to OFHEO."
The 1992 Act also imposed, for the first time, explicit and
quantitative goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac relating to the
51. GAO REPORT, supra note 40, at 14.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 19 (discussing the principles of a cooperative).
54. GAO REPORT, supra note 40, at 14.
55. Id at 15.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Housing and Economic Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 119-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(codified in scattered sections ofthe U.S. Code).
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purchase of mortgage loans from lower-income families and individuals
and at rates of return on such mortgage loans below those from other
activities. The companies had previously possessed an explicit, but
general, statutory mission to provide assistance with respect to
mortgages secured by housing which was owned by low and moderate
income Americans, but only if such mortgage loans involved reasonable
economic returns, and such goals had not been explicitly quantitative in
nature. In 2000, and again in 2005, in a continued and bipartisan effort
to promote expanded homeownership opportunities and to ensure that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were serving their public missions, HUD
began to increase the severity of the companies' affordable housing
goals by raising the percentage of loan purchases that were to come
from very low and moderate income Americans, from those living in
low income areas, and from new home purchases rather than
refinancings.59 Prior to 2001, these goals were relatively modest and
emphasized the companies' financial health.60 Between 2004 and 2007,
at the height of the mortgage bubble, between fifty and fifty-five
percent of loan purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
required to be from low and moderate income households. The
companies generally exceeded these goals during this period.61
Also during the height of the bubble years, the companies,
especially Freddie Mac, engaged in significant purchases of "Alt-A"
MBS. These are loans in which the borrowers generally do not
document their incomes or have higher loan-to-value ratios or debt-to-
income ratios than what are considered to be "prime" mortgage loans.
Prime mortgages were the heart of the companies' mortgage lending
throughout much of their history. By the end of 2007, Fannie Mae and
58. GAO REPORT, supra note 40, at 16; see also FCIC GSE REPORT, supra note 12, at
6. The 1992 Act established three explicit housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
the first, related to purchases of mortgage loans to homeowners with incomes at or below
the area median; the second related to purchases of mortgage loans to homeowners with
incomes at or below sixty percent of an area median, or to homeowners with incomes at or
below eighty percent of an area median and living in census tracts in which the median
income is at or below eighty percent of the area median; and the final goal related to
purchases of mortgage loans to homeowners living in census tracts in which the median
income is at or below ninety percent of the area median, or census tracts in which minorities
comprise at least thirty percent of residents and the median income in such tract does not
exceed one hundred and twenty percent of the area median. Id.
59. GAO REPORT, supra note 40, at 22; FCIC GSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
60. GAO REPORT, supra note 40, at 22; FCIC GSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
61. GAO REPORT, supra note 40, at 23.
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Freddie Mac held more than $313 billion in private-label MBS
(PLMBS), $219 billion of which was held by Freddie Mac.62
According to one report, the 2004 increase in affordable housing goals
by HUD provided the "incentive" for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
purchase higher-return, but also higher-risk, assets such as Alt-A
mortgages and PLMBS backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages to
low and moderate income Americans.63 In many ways, the combination
of affordable housing goals and public shareholder demands provided
the perfect storm for the companies to engage in what was considered
socially-desirable, but also highly risky behavior. This behavior would
ultimately end in the demise of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and a
multi-billion dollar tab for the U.S. taxpayers.
Starting in the late 1990s, the combined retained portfolios of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac64 increased substantially from less than
$500 billion to approximately $1.5 trillion in 2003.65 These are
generally considered to be the companies' higher-yielding assets.
Meanwhile the amount of MBS outstanding increased during the same
period from under $1.5 trillion to almost $4 trillion.66 During the height
of the housing boom, the companies' retained portfolios generally
declined, but began to rise significantly again in 2007.67 Finally, the
MBS outstanding continued to rise to almost $5.5 trillion by 2008.68
At the same time that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
increasing their investment portfolios, the share of home mortgage loan
originations that they were purchasing for securitization was generally
declining. Their share of such originations of U.S. home mortgage
loans increased steadily from the late 1990s until 2003, reaching almost
sixty percent in 2003, and then declined during the height of the housing
mania from 2004 to 2006 to around forty percent. 69 During this period,
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id.
64. That is, the mortgage loans purchased by them and not securitized.
65. OFFICE OF FED. Hous. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, 2007 REPORT TO CONG. 6 fig.3 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 OFHEO REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=210 (click on hyperlink entitled "2007 OFHEO
Report to Congress").
66. FCICGSE REPORT,supra note 12,at 14 fig.7.
67. See 2007 OFHEO REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 65, at 6 fig.3.
68. FCIC GSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 14 fig.7.
69. Id. at 12 fig.6.
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the non-agency securitization market grew substantially. 70 The collapse
of the private market from 2007 onward increased the companies' share
of mortgage originations to over sixty percent of the market.7 1
While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were experiencing financial
distress in late 2007 and early 2008, including difficulty raising capital,
the FHLBanks were providing substantial liquidity to the U.S. financial
72
system. The FHLBanks were able to continue to access the debt
markets partially because their debt obligations are issued on a joint and
several basis, so that failure by any one FHLBank to satisfy a
consolidated obligation would result in the other FHLBanks making
payment on that indebtedness to the holders. FHLBank debt obligations
are also "secured" in effect by the advances and other high-quality
assets owned by the FHLBanks. These advances are in turn fully-
collateralized by mortgages and other assets pledged by the U.S.
financial system that compose the membership of the FHLBanks.
Secured advances from the FHLBanks to the nation's financial
institutions rose from approximately $640 billion in 2006 to
approximately $930 billion in 2008, an increase in liquidity from the
FHLBanks to the nation's banking sector of almost fifty percent over
three years. The FHLBanks had little difficulty fulfilling this role for
their member banks in a low-risk manner due to the system's
cooperative structure. 74 Borrowers from the FHLBanks must purchase
70. In a non-agency securitization, a bank or other financial institution (a sponsor)
acquires mortgages either by originating them or purchasing them from another institution.
The loans are then passed to a trust or other special purpose entity, which issues securities
representing beneficial interests in the assets owned by the issuer. These securities however
are not guaranteed by the sponsoring bank, however, unlike an agency MBS. Non-agency
MBS were structured to offer different classes of securities, or tranches, offering various
levels of risk to appeal to different classes of investors. Some tranches were structured to be
low risk and appeal to investors with low risk tolerances through a series of credit
enhancement techniques known as subordination and over-collateralization. In
subordination, lower level tranches of an issue are not paid until more senior tranches are
paid. In over-collateralization, securities were collateralized with greater amounts of assets
in the trust or special purpose vehicle. Senior tranches of non-agency MBS typically were
structured to achieve a AAA credit rating so the securities could be sold to investors limited
to investing in AAA securities. See id. at 5-7.
71. Id. at 10 fig.4.
72. KEvORK KIHRIMIAN & DARI BARZEL, MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICES A DIMINISHED
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM WOULD WEAKEN US BANKS (2011).
73. FED. HOME LOAN BANKS, OFFICE OF FIN., 2008 COMBINED FINANCIAL REPORT 48
(2008), available at http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofwebuserWeb/resources/08yrend.pdf.
74. While several of the FHLBanks have experienced significant losses on investments
in PLMBS, they have been able to absorb these losses and remain adequately capitalized
due to the cooperative capital structure of the FHLBanks.
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capital stock in the Banks to borrow from them, effectively capitalizing
the growth in assets. Borrowers must also pledge high-quality assets as
collateral for these loans. The combination of collateralized borrowing
and capital investment by the borrowing members provides a low-risk
but effective model for pushing out liquidity quickly and efficiently to
the U.S. banking system. This model also ensures that mortgage
lenders that borrow from the FHLBanks are highly-regulated and
maintain a substantial stake and interest in the long-term viability of the
system. Finally, as a cooperative in which returns are generated from
income from customer-shareholders, there is little demand from
shareholders for increasing and large returns, although the FHLBanks
seek to pay a "competitive" dividend to their members as a return for
the capital investment.
In 2008, responding to the increasing distress in the housing
market and concern regarding the health of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Reform Act of 2008
(HERA). HERA established the FHFA as the regulator of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, as well as of the FHLBank System. HERA granted to
FHFA substantially greater powers than those granted to OFHEO,
including the power to require additional capital of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, as well as the power to place the enterprises into
conservatorship or receivership. The FHLBanks' prior regulator, the
Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) already possessed many of
these powers, and had exercised certain of these powers with respect to
several FHLBanks in the years leading up to the crisis. This may
partially explain the relative performance of the FHLBanks during the
crisis, as compared to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
III. CURRENT HOUSING FINANCE REFORM PROPOSALS
A. Administration White Paper and the Three Options
In February 2011, the Obama Administration issued its long-
awaited report to Congress on housing finance reform (White Paper).
The White Paper identifies several fundamental flaws in the mortgage
market that led to the financial crisis: poor consumer protections; an
antiquated regulatory structure; complex securitizations that lacked
75. REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET, supra note 8.
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transparency, standardization, and accountability; inadequate capital in
the financial system; and ill-equipped servicers. The White Paper faults
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for straying from their core mission of
providing liquidity for prime mortgages in order to gain market share
and increase returns to shareholders. The White Paper also identifies
poor oversight and inadequate capital as causes for the companies'
insolvency. The White Paper calls for a "substantially reduced" role for
government support of the mortgage market in the future.
In the near term, the Administration advocates for winding
down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on a responsible timeline. The
White Paper advocates increasing the guarantee fees that Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac charge their mortgage sellers in order to attract private
issuers back into the mortgage market. The Administration pledges to
work with FHFA to develop structures that put private capital ahead of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantees in future MBS issuances. 76
The White Paper also advocates reducing Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's investment portfolio.
The Administration also advocates restoring FHA to its
traditional role as a targeted lender of affordable mortgages to first-time
homebuyers and low- and moderate-income Americans. The
Administration advocates returning FHA's percentage of the mortgage
market to 10 to 15 percent, a decrease from its current 30 percent. The
White Paper commits the Administration to raising the cost of FHA
insurance in 2012 and beyond.
Finally, the Administration advocates several changes to the
FHLBank system. The White Paper advocates limits on the amount of
advances that a member of a FHLBank may acquire. It also
recommends that membership of a single financial holding company be
limited to a single FHLBank. These proposals are intended to reduce
the ability of larger financial institutions to access the FHLBank system.
The White Paper also advocates reducing the investment portfolios of
the FHLBanks due to losses suffered by some of the FHLBanks on
76. FHFA Acting Director DeMarco has made similar comments. He has said that
Fannie and Freddie will raise guarantee fees in 2011 and will continue in 2012 and may
raise those fees higher in judicial foreclosure states due to increased risk. DeMarco has also
stated that Fannie and Freddie may issue non-guaranteed MBS and tranches with different
risk profiles. Finally, he has indicated that Fannie and Freddie will stop offering volume
discounts because they don't need to compete any longer in conservatorship. See Kate
Berry, Freddie, Fannie Raise Fees, May Kill Volume Discounts, AM. BANKER, Sept. 19,
2011.
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investments in private-label MBS.
The White Paper identifies four key factors and three primary
options for reforming the U.S. mortgage market. 77 The four factors are:
(1) access to mortgage credit; (2) incentives for investment in housing;
(3) taxpayer protection; and (4) financial and economic stability. The
White Paper states that government support for housing finance can
expand access to mortgage credit for creditworthy borrowers, thus
lowering the cost of mortgages and increasing the availability of
products such as the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. The government can
also help standardize the mortgage market through setting criteria for
the mortgages it will support. Additionally, the government can
increase access to the secondary market for smaller lenders and
community banks, thus promoting a more competitive market.
The first of the three options for reforming the mortgage market
outlined in the White Paper is largely a "private" system of mortgage
capital that confines the government's role to assistance for a limited
number of homeowners, such as veterans or first-time homebuyers with
limited income and assets. The second option would include a
government guarantee mechanism, but that mechanism would remain
largely dormant during normal economic times and only scale up during
market turbulence. Finally, the third option, which many suspect to be
the preference of the Administration, would involve issuance of a
government guarantee or reinsurance plan for conventional, conforming
MBS on a regular basis.
B. House Republican Proposals to Eliminate Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac
The Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives
has offered a number of legislative proposals to reduce, and gradually
eliminate, the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. housing
market. One bill would end the conservatorship in two years and
require that the companies be made fully private or placed into
receivership.78 The Republican majority has also proposed that Fannie
77. REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET, supra note 8, at 25-29.
78. GSE Bailout Elimination and Taxpayer Protection Act, H.R. 1182, 112th Cong.
(2011). A receivership under FHFA regulations would require the FHFA to wind down the
companies, as opposed to a conservatorship, which involves the preservation of assets with
the possibility of returning the companies to normal operations at some future date. See 12
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Mae and Freddie Mac be required to increase the fees that they assess
against mortgage loan sellers for the credit guarantee they provide on
their purchased loans. 79 The other bills recommend various avenues of
reform: (1) abolish Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's affordable housing
goals;80 reduce the size of their retained mortgage portfolio;8 1 (2)
require the U.S. Treasury to approve all debt issuances by the
companies and justify such approvals to Congress within seven days;82
(3) prohibit the companies from engaging in any new business
activities;83 and (4) suspend the compensation packages for executives
of the companies and place all other employees on the government's
civil service pay scale.84
However, none of these proposals comprehensively address the
fundamental question of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's current and
outsized role in the housing finance market or their potential
replacement. Recently, members of Congress from both parties (and in
some cases, on a bipartisan basis) have introduced a number of serious
proposals to reform the housing finance market in the wake of the
housing "boom and bust" and the subsequent failure of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. These proposals largely divide along three lines: (1)
enhancing the role of government in supporting housing finance; 86 (2)
restarting private securitization; 87 and (3) adding additional mechanisms
for generating capital to support housing in the United States, such as
covered bonds.
C.F.R. § 1237.3(b) (2011).
79. GSE Subsidy Elimination Act of 2011, H.R. 1222, 112th Cong. (2011). The
Director of FHFA may implement the increases over three years after consideration of
market conditions.
80. GSE Mission Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1226, 112th Cong. (2011).
81. GSE Portfolio Risk Reduction Act of 2011, H.R. 1224, 112th Cong. (2011).
82. GSE Debt Issuance Approval Act of 2011, H.R. 1225, 112th Cong. (2011).
83. GSE Risk and Activities Limitation Act of 2011, H.R. 1227, 112th Cong. (2011).
84. Equity in Government Compensation Act of 2011, H.R. 1221, 112th Cong. (2011).
85. See infra Part III.C-E.
86. See infra Part III.C.
87. See infra Part III.D.
88. See infra Part III.E.
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C. Proposals to Enhance the Role of Government in the Housing
Market
Many of the more substantive proposals in Congress
envisioning a housing finance system without Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac would continue to rely substantially on government support for the
market.
1. Campbell-Peters Bill
Representative John Campbell from California and
Representative Gary Peters from Michigan introduced a bipartisan
proposal for housing finance reform. 89 Their bill would gradually wind
down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with their FHFA charters and
transform the entities into privately-owned and privately-managed
housing finance guaranty associations (HFGAs). 90 These new entities
would have the power to purchase conventional mortgages only for the
purpose of creating a secondary market for such mortgages, thus
facilitating securitization, and supporting multifamily housing.9' The
government, through the FHFA, would explicitly guarantee the MBS
issued by the HFGAs.92 In many respects, this legislative proposal is a
further elaboration of the Administration's third option in the White
Paper.
This proposal has the advantage of continuing many of the
benefits of the current securitization-dominated housing finance market,
including the ability to provide a liquid market for home mortgage loans
on a national basis.93 The HFGAs would also likely provide much of
the market standardization currently provided by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The HFGAs also could be used to support affordable
housing goals, possibly through a requirement that these entities use a
certain percentage of their profits for affordable housing.9 4  This
89. Housing Finance Reform Act of 2011, H.R. 1859, 112th Cong. (2011).
90. Id.
91. Id. sec. 3, § 1384.
92. Id. sec. 3, § 1386.
93. See id. § 2.
94. This is similar to the FHLBanks' Affordable Housing Program (AHP), which has
distributed over $4 billion in grants for affordable housing since 1990 without exposing the
FHLBanks to additional credit risk. The FHLBanks are required to distribute at least ten
percent of their profits back to their communities through their member-shareholders. 12
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proposal also would focus the HFGAs on the securitization side of the
business conducted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,95 which is
generally considered to be lower risk than the accumulation of
portfolios of mortgage assets.
In order to allow smaller community lenders to effectively
access the private securitization market, one or more of these HFGAs
could be structured as a cooperative, similar to the current FHLBanks.96
Cooperatives are generally favored by those seeking to ensure access to
the secondary market for mortgage loans for smaller lenders. 97
Cooperatives are also viewed as having a safer capital structure and
being better aligned with interest rates than a regular for-profit
corporation.98 Finally, a cooperative structure usually results in a lower
cost institution with a narrow mission focused on securitization.9 9
2. Miller-McCarthy Bill
Representative George Miller from California and
Representative Carolyn McCarthy from New York introduced another
bipartisan bill aimed at eliminating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
replacing them with a Secondary Market Facility for Residential
Mortgages (Facility)."0 o This Facility would issue and guarantee
MBS. 10' It would be an instrumentality of the federal government
overseen by a board of five members appointed by the President. 10 2 The
U.S.C. § 1430(j)(5) (2006). The AHP does not impact the credit underwriting standards of
the FHLBanks in terms of lending on advances or investment decisions, unlike the
affordable housing goals applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
95. See H.R. 1859 sec. 3, § 1387.
96. See Toni Dechario et al., A Private Lender Cooperative Model for Residential
Mortgage Finance 7-16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 466,
Aug. 2010) [hereinafter NYFed Staff Report], available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staffreports/sr466.pdf.; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-11-33R, THE COOPERATIVE MODEL AS A POTENTIAL COMPONENT OF
STRUCTURAL REFORM OPTIONS FOR FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC (2010) [hereinafter
FANNIE AND FREDDIE REPORT]; Brian Collins, Cato Institute: A Co-op Can Replace Fannie
and Freddie, NAT'L MORTG. NEWS (May 24, 2011, 11:51 AM),
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/on-features/replace-fannie-freddie-1024905-1.html.
97. See Collins, supra note 96.
98. See FANNIE AND FREDDIE REPORT, supra note 96, at 33-34.
99. See NYFed Staff Report, supra note 96, at 13.
100. Secondary Market Facility for Residential Mortgages Act, H.R. 2413, 112th Cong.
(2011).
101. Id. § 101.
102. See id
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Director of the FHFA would be replaced with a new board structure,
distinct from that of the Facility, composed of the Secretaries of
Treasury and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and three
members appointed by the President.10 3
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be wound down within
three years of the bill's enactment.104 The Facility would be required to
manage and liquidate the investment portfolios of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in an orderly manner. 0 5 The Facility would maintain the
secondary market for residential mortgages, including the TBA, or "to-
be-announced" market.106 The Facility's market share is not to exceed
fifty percent of the mortgage originations in the U.S., and the portfolio
limit for the Facility would be $250 billion.07
The Facility would price guarantee fees based on the risk of the
product.108  The Facility would collect, and transfer to a reinsurance
fund, a reinsurance fee paid by purchasers of MBS.'09 The fee would be
based on the outstanding mortgage exposure of the Facility and is
designed to cover potential obligations of the Facility beyond its
capital.110 The reinsurance fund is maintained by the Treasury."'
3. Mortgage Finance Act of 2011
Senator Johnny Isakson from Georgia introduced the Mortgage
Finance Act of 2011 in December 201 1.112 The bill would place Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac into receivership no later than eighteen months
103. Id. § 301.
104. Id §201.
105. Id.
106. H.R. 2413 § 101. Most trading in Fannie and Freddie mortgage-backed securities
occurs in the to-be-announced, or TBA, forward market, in which participants agree on a
price on these securities before the underlying collateral is known. See NYFed Staff Report,
supra note 96, at 4. This differs from private securitizations in which the price is based on
the assets in the trust. Id. at 5. The TBA market is made possible by the exemption from
registration for Fannie and Freddie securities and assumption of homogeneity in the assets
backing Fannie and Freddie securities, and in turn, allows lenders to offer borrowers the
ability to lock in their interest rates for a period prior to closing. Id. at 4-5.
107. H.R. 2413 §§ 103, 108.
108. Id. § 105.
109. Id. § 106.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Mortgage Finance Act of 2011, S. 1963, 112th Cong. (2011).
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after the bill's enactment.'" 3 The bill would require the FHFA to begin
liquidating the companies immediately, and their government charters
would terminate after liquidation.114 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
would be allowed to continue to provide mortgage guarantees while a
new government agency, the Mortgage Finance Agency (MFA), is
established.' 1
The MFA would guarantee mortgage-backed securities issued
by private lenders, similar to the current structure of Ginnie Mae." 6
The MFA would be overseen by a five member board consisting of the
Director of the MFA, a presidentially-appointed Vice Chair, the Chair
of the SEC, the Secretary of HUD, and the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve System. "7  The bill would require the MFA to be privatized
after ten years, at which point no securities issued by the agency would
be federally guaranteed." 8 The agency would begin planning for
privatization within three years of its establishment and begin
implementing the plan in year five.
The MFA would only be permitted to guarantee mortgage loans
that meet certain standards established in the bill and its implementing
regulations.1 9 The bill amends the definition of "qualified residential
mortgages" under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) to permit mortgage loans with down
payments of at least five percent to qualify, as opposed to the twenty
percent requirement in the proposed regulations implementing this
provision in Dodd-Frank.120  The bill would require equal guarantee
113. Id. § 101. Under 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(b), the FHFA must place a regulated entity
under its jurisdiction into liquidation if the FHFA is appointed as receiver, rather than
conservator, of such regulated entity. 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(b) (2011).
114. S. 1963 § 101.
115. Id.
116. See id. § 301; see also supra note 10.
117. S. 1963 § 202.
118. See id §§ 202, 304.
119. Id. § 302.
120. Id. § 2; see also Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24090, 24124 (proposed Apr.
29, 2011). Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act requires that the federal banking agencies and certain other agencies jointly prescribe
regulations that require issuers and certain other parties to a securitization transaction to
maintain at least five percent of the credit risk in the assets securitized throughout the life of
the securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (Supp. IV 2010). There is an exemption for MBS
backed by "qualified residential mortgages," which is to be defined by the regulators as
well. Id. The regulators issued a joint proposal to implement these provisions of Dodd-
Frank on April 29, 2011. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24090. This proposal was the
subject of many comment letters and remains to be finalized.
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pricing across all lenders selling mortgages. 121  This is similar to the
statutory requirement that FHLBanks treat all of their members fairly.122
The MFA would be required to price its guarantee such that it will be
able to capitalize a new catastrophic fund to cover any expected and
unexpected losses on its guarantee, purchase supplemental private-
sector insurance and finance its operations.123
It is not clear in the Isakson proposal whether the privatized
MFA would be sold to the private sector as a whole, or broken up into
parts. While the whole MFA would likely be very attractive to the
private sector, it could also create an entity with monopolistic pricing
power unrestrained by government ownership. This could lead to a
situation in which the MFA is privatized into a cooperative, or a series
of cooperatives, such as the FHLBanks. A cooperative structure seems
consistent with the concept of equal pricing of the loan guarantee
provided by the agency.
The MFA proposal seems aimed at giving some time for a
successor to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to self-capitalize under
government control, which is a worthy objective. However, this
proposal also leaves substantial questions as to the exact shape of the
mortgage market that comes after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
liquidated and much of their assets, infrastructure, and personnel are
transferred to a privatized MFA.
D. Proposal to Restart the Private Securitization Market
Representative Scott Garrett from New Jersey, the current
Chairman of the Capital Markets Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Financial Services Committee, has introduced
legislation to reinvigorate the mortgage securitization market outside of
the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed MBS.12 4 This legislation
121. S. 1963 § 303.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 1427(j) (2006).
123. See S. 1963 § 303.
124. Private Mortgage Market Investment Act, H.R. 3644, 112th Cong. (2011). Senator
Corker (R-TN) has introduced a similar bill in the Senate. Residential Mortgage Market
Privatization and Standardization Act of 2011, S. 1834, 112th Cong. (2011). While the
Corker bill would also eliminate the credit risk retention provisions in Dodd-Frank, it would
replace it with a minimum five percent down payment requirement and require credit
enhancement for loans with loan-to-value ratios in excess of 80 percent. Id § 7. The
Corker bill also includes provisions to begin to wind down Fannie and Freddie at a rate of at
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would require the Director of FHFA to classify mortgages according to
credit risk and establish underwriting standards for each class.125 These
underwriting standards would cover debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-
value ratios, credit history, loan documentation, occupancy status, credit
enhancement, loan payment terms, and such other criteria as the
Director of FHFA may establish consistent with the goals of the
legislation. 126  The classes of mortgages must include the thirty-year
fixed rate mortgage as one of the products offered.127 The objective of
these underwriting standards is to allow investors in MBS to determine
the class of mortgages underlying their securities.
The Director of FHFA would also be charged with developing
and publishing standard forms of securitization agreements.' 28  The
documentation must include representations and warranties from the
seller; indemnification and remedies; and the qualifications,
responsibilities and duties of the trustees.' 29 The FHFA Director is also
charged with establishing standards for servicer reporting, loan
modifications, and loan documentation and verification of borrower
qualifications. 30
The legislation also requires the Director of FHFA to establish
standards for qualified sponsors of MBS that would be qualified
securities.131 Qualified securities would be issued in accordance with
the mortgage underwriting and documentation standards promulgated
by the FHFA. The FHFA would also issue requirements for trustees of
qualified MBS.13 2 The investors in qualified MBS would be authorized
to hire an independent third party to act on their behalf.'33 That investor
representative would be granted access to the mortgage loan
least ten percent per year. Id. § 3. The Corker bill requires the FHFA to develop a
mortgage electronic registration system. Id. § 8. The Corker bill would require the FHFA
to establish a program to encourage development of a futures market in residential
mortgages to replace the TBA market. Id. § 5. The new futures market would be limited to
qualified mortgages under the bill, and MBS collateralized by these mortgages would be
exempt from registration under the securities laws. Id
125. H.R. 3644 § 101.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 101(b).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 101(c).
131. H.R. 3644 § 101(f).
132. Id. § 101(g).
133. Id. § 101(h).
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documentation backing the MBS and the MBS investor list.134  He
would also have the right to inform the trustee on behalf of the investors
of any breach or default of the securitization documents.' 35 Disputes
between investors and sponsors are subject to mandatory arbitration
procedures issued by the FHFA.13 1
The Garrett bill would repeal the credit risk retention provisions
of Dodd-Frank 37 and grant an exemption from registration of qualified
securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission.'38 This last
provision is intended to continue the function of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac securities in setting the TBA market.' 39
The Garrett bill has been praised as a thoughtful attempt to
restart the private mortgage securitization market. 140 Criticism of the
bill has included concerns that the qualified securities under the bill may
be deemed to possess an implicit government guarantee and investors
would ignore credit risk in these securities. Another concern is the
bill's provision of exemption from the securities laws and whether
investors would be adequately informed of and protected against risks
in the purchase of these securities.
E. Proposals to Allow Banks to Keep Mortgage Loans on Balance
Sheet: Covered Bonds
Another proposal aimed at reducing Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's importance to the housing market is the creation of a large
functioning covered bond market in the U.S. Covered bonds are debt
securities collateralized by a pool of assets.141 In addition to the
collateral for the securities, holders of covered bonds have an unsecured
claim for any deficiency in payment of the securities against the
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id § 1010).
137. H.R. 3644 § 102.
138. See id § 103.
139. See supra note 106.
140. Donna Borak, Garrett's Housing Finance Plan Gains Momentum, Support, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 4, 2011. FHFA Acting Director DeMarco has praised the Garrett plan for
envisioning a mortgage market without government support, and does not believe that a
qualified security under the plan would be deemed to have an implicit government
guarantee. Id
141. Steven L. Schwartz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 Bus. LAW. 561, 562
(2011).
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issuer.142 Unlike a typical mortgage-backed security, the assets remain
on the balance sheet of the issuer, and the issuer is obligated to replace
assets in the pool while the bonds are outstanding if an asset fails to
meet certain specified credit requirements.143  This ensures that the
bonds maintain a certain level of collateralization, or over-
collateralization, throughout the life of the issue.144
There are two types of legal regimes under which covered bonds
have been issued. One is a legislative regime, in which the legal rights
and provisions applicable to covered bonds are spelled out in specific
authorizing legislation. 145 The other is a structured regime in which
legal rights and remedies are governed by contractual agreements and
otherwise applicable law.146
Covered bonds started in eighteenth century Prussia, but have
waxed and waned since that time as a vehicle for financing mortgage
debt in Europe.147 However, since the 1990s, covered bonds have re-
emerged in many European countries as a central mechanism for
funneling mortgage credit to homeowners.148 There have been two
covered bond issuances in the United States in recent years, one by
Washington Mutual, the obligations for which have been assumed by
J.P. Morgan, and the other by Bank of America. 149 Canada had its first
covered bond issuance in late 2007,150 and Australia issued its first
covered bonds in 2011.' 5'
142. Id.
143. American Securitization Forum, U.S. Covered Bonds: A Discussion Paper for the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2 (Aug. 2007),
http://www.americansecuritization.com/index.aspx?id=2701 (under "ASF Releases" click
on hyperlink entitled "background paper"); Schwartz, supra note 141, at 563.
144. Schwartz, supra note 141, at 563.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 563-64.
148. See Introducing Covered Bonds, EUROPEAN COVERED BOND CouNcL,
http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PagelD=504 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
149. Schwartz, supra note 141, at 564. Although the Washington Mutual and Bank of
America covered bond issuances are the only two in recent years from U.S.-based financial
institutions, there has been a recent surge in U.S.-dollar issuances by foreign financial
entities. See Michael Aneiro, Covered Bonds Creeping into US. Market, Again, BARRON'S
(Nov. 17, 2011, 5:40 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/incomeinvesting/2011/11/17/covered-
bonds-creeping-into-u-s-market-again/.
150. Royal Bank of Canada Covered Bond Demand Strong, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2007,
4:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/23/royalbankofcanada-bond-
idUSN2331883420071023.
151. Malcom Maiden, Covered Bonds Will Help Bank Funding But Aren't A Game-
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In addition to the Private Mortgage Market Investment Act,
discussed above, Representative Garrett of New Jersey has introduced
the United States Covered Bond Act of 201 1.152 This legislation is
intended to provide greater legal certainty for covered bonds with the
policy goal of encouraging the development of this market. 1 53
Proponents believe that covered bonds may serve as an additional
source of mortgage credit, potentially reducing the market's current
reliance on government entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The Covered Bond Act was approved by the House Financial Services
Committee on June 22, 2011 by a vote of 44 to 7.154
The Covered Bond Act would establish regulatory oversight for
the development of a covered bond market in the federal banking
regulators and the U.S. Treasury.' 55 Eligible issuers of covered bonds
would include regulated financial institutions as well as systemically
important non-bank financial institutions and their affiliates. 156
Importantly, unlike in some European countries, the Covered Bond Act
would permit different types of covered bonds backed by a wide variety
of assets, including those backed by home mortgage loans. 15 7 The bill
would establish minimum collateralization requirements for the bonds
and permit the regulators to charge fees for administering the
program.158 The Covered Bond Act would provide for a limit on the
amount of a regulated financial institution's assets that may be pledged
toward covered bonds.159 This limit would be set by the institution's
primary federal regulator and may be adjusted quarterly based on the
institution's financial condition.160
Changer, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 17, 2011,
http://www.smh.com.au/business/covered-bonds-will-help-bank-funding-but-arent-a-
gamechanger-20111116-Injbo.html.
152. United States Covered Bond Act, H.R. 940, 112th Cong. (2011). Senator Corker
(R-TN) and Senator Hagan (D-NY) have issued a companion bill in the Senate. United
States Covered Bond Act, S. 1835, 112th Cong. (2011).
153. H.R. 940.
154. Legal Update, Patrick P. Dolan et al., Dechert LLP, Update Regarding the United
States Covered Bond Act, 1 (July 11, 2011),
http://www.dechert.com/Update Regarding the UnitedStatesCoveredBondAct 07-11 -
2011 (follow Download PDF hyperlink).
155. H.R. 940.
156. Id. § 2.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 3.
159. Id.
160. See Miller Jefferson, Note, The Emerging US. Market for Covered Bonds, 13 N.C.
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When insured depository institutions or systemically significant
institutions act as issuers, the FDIC would have up to 180 days after the
date of its appointment as receiver or conservator to transfer the covered
bond pool and all obligations on the bonds to another eligible issuer.
If the FDIC fails to perform on the covered bonds or does not complete
a transfer within 180 days, the bill would permit the appointment of a
separate trustee or administrator for the covered bonds, which would
hold the assets supporting the covered bonds in a separate insolvency
estate not subject to the claims of the FDIC.162  This is important for
investors concerned that a receivership could result in an unexpected
early prepayment of the obligations, especially during a period of
declining interest rates, which would expose the investors to substantial
reinvestment risk.
This "ring-fencing" of assets has drawn considerable opposition
from the FDIC, which, during a receivership, is the largest unsecured
creditor of a failed bank after it has paid all of the insured depositors. 163
The FDIC argues that the Covered Bond Act "fails to maintain that
important balance between investor demands and government
exposure." 64  The FDIC also believes Congress would be creating a
BANKING INST. 263, 266 (2009) (discussing the issuance of covered bonds).
161. H.R. 940 § 4.
162. Id.
163. Legislative Proposals to Create a Covered Bond Market in the United States:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Gov't Sponsered Enters., 112th
Cong. 139 (2011) [hereinafter Proposals to Create a Covered Bond Market] (statement of
the Fed. Depository Ins. Corp.).
164. Id. at 131. FDIC issued a final Policy Statement on Covered Bonds in July 2008.
Covered Bond Policy Statement, 73 Fed. Reg. 43754 (July 28, 2008). The final Policy
Statement defined a covered bond as a non-deposit, recourse debt obligation of an insured
depository with a term of between one and thirty years secured by a pool of eligible
mortgages, or up to ten percent in AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities. Covered bonds
under the Policy Statement may not exceed more than four percent of the depository's total
liabilities. The mortgages in the asset pool also must be subject to certain consumer
protection standards as outlined in the Interagency Guidance on Non-Traditional Mortgage
Products, October 5, 2006, and the Interagency Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending,
July 10, 2007, as well as future guidance in this area. The FDIC also requires that the
depository hold and own the pledged collateral and not transfer those assets to a subsidiary
or special-purpose vehicle. The Policy Statement provides the consent of the FDIC, as
conservator or receiver, for obligees on covered bonds to exercise their contractual rights
over the collateral no sooner than ten business days after a monetary default on the covered
bonds, or the effective date of a repudiation of the covered bonds by the receiver or
conservator. Typically, an obligee would be required to wait forty-five days for a
conservatorship, or ninety days for a receivership, before being permitted by the conservator
or receiver from accessing and liquidating the collateral. The FDIC Policy Statement,
unlike the Covered Bond Act, would not require that the FDIC permit the covered bonds to
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government-subsidized, implicitly-guaranteed class of securities
through this ring-fencing. According to the FDIC, the benefits of this
structure would accrue mainly to large, complex financial institutions
that would enjoy funding advantages over smaller competitors. Finally,
the FDIC has advocated for removing the Treasury's power to set
standards for covered bond programs of regulated financial institutions,
but believes this authority should rest with the federal banking
regulators who would issue these standards on a joint basis.65
The FDIC argues that the structured regime for covered bonds
in the United States is preferable to the legislative regime in Europe.1 66
In the FDIC's analysis, the pre-crisis issuance of covered bonds proved
that U.S. financial institutions could successfully issue covered bonds
without the need for a specific legislative framework, or in the FDIC's
words, a "government guarantee."l 67  The FDIC has noted that
European covered bonds often trade closer to sovereign debt due to the
generous collateral protections embedded in the European statutes. The
FDIC believes the perception by markets that covered bonds are "risk
free" may distort markets and lead to another financial crisis.,68
Although covered bonds are generally considered to be very
safe investments, the ratings agency Standard & Poor's (S&P) recently
issued a report warning of underestimated credit risk in covered bonds
depending on the characteristics of the underlying mortgages.1 69 S&P
noted that covered bond issuances may include assets of differing credit
quality and that the credit characteristics of the component assets are not
always clearly disclosed to investors.o7 0  S&P also noted that it
remain outstanding, or that the pledged collateral be segregated into a separate estate for the
benefit of the covered bonds.
165. Proposals to Create a Covered Bond Market, supra note 163, at 145 (statement of
the Fed. Depository Ins. Corp.). The FDIC has stated that any covered bond oversight
program should address types of collateral, underwriting standards, required over-
collateralization, frequency and content of reports on collateral, disclosure standards, and
rights of investors. Id at 142.
166. Id. at 132.
167. Id. at 140.
168. Id. at 132-33.
169. Sabrina Miehs et al., Never Underestimate Credit Risk in Mortgage Covered
Bonds, STANDARD & POOR'S (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/eul?articleType=HTML&assetlD=124
5319495209; see also Tracy Alloway, S&P Report Urges Covered Bond Caution, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, http://www.fl.com/cms/s/0/f3d93b72-dele-1 ie0-9fb7-
001 44feabdcO.html#axzz 1 kPTAFE8q.
170. See Miehs et al., supra note 169.
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primarily looks at the amount of over-collateralization in determining
the credit rating on a covered bond issue, but the credit characteristics of
the underlying assets also play an important part in determining the
likelihood of default of the issue.17 1
In many ways, this discussion resembles the private-label, or
non-agency, MBS in which credit ratings were determined based on the
subordination in the transaction, rather than the credit characteristics of
the underlying assets in the trust.172 It is important that policymakers
not allow covered bonds to develop in a similar fashion. Covered bonds
should be held to rigorous standards of disclosure and consumer and
investor protection. Furthermore, issuers of covered bonds should be
required to have an independent third-party verify on an annual basis
that the assets in the pool meet the requirements of the issuing
documentation. The issuing documentation should also provide for an
independent investor advocate in case there is a dispute between the
issuer and the investors with respect to the pledged collateral or other
provisions of the issuing documentation.
Although covered bonds may be part of a comprehensive
solution for the U.S. mortgage market, they are unlikely to fully replace
the support to that market from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or from
private-label securitization. Fitch has estimated that covered bonds can
cover only between ten and twelve percent of the amount of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac MBS outstanding. 173 Fitch has noted that this estimate
is probably too large as it assumes all U.S. financial institutions could
issue up to four percent of its total liabilities in the form of covered
bonds. Smaller financial institutions are unlikely to be able to access
the covered bond market directly.
IV. A PATH FORWARD: ALL OF THE ABOVE
As described in the foregoing pages, in 2011, there have been a
number of thoughtful and substantive proposals to envision a housing
finance market without Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Unfortunately, it
does not appear that any of these proposals are likely to become law
171. Id.
172. Adam Ashcraft et al., MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom 6 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 449, May 2010), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr449.pdf.
173. LEE & GROSSMAN, supra note 6.
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until after the 2012 presidential election. It is easy to imagine how
elements of many of these proposals could be merged into a single,
comprehensive bill to reform America's broken housing finance system.
Ultimately, such a comprehensive approach also has the benefit of being
consistent with the normal structure of U.S. financial reform legislation.
Senator Isakson's bill provides a road map for winding down
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.174 It is clear that most policymakers, and
indeed, the taxpaying public, would resist any proposal to simply
restore these entities to their prior existence. Under the Isakson
proposal, it should take relatively little time to transfer the assets and
personnel from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the new Mortgage
Finance Agency (MFA).175 That would allow Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to be liquidated quickly. In order to speed up this process, it may
be advisable to have the new MFA explicitly assume the obligations of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that the market for U.S. agency is not
disturbed.
After any legislation has dealt with the future of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, it is important for the bill to establish a structure for the
future contours of the housing finance market. Both the Isakson bill and
the Campbell-Peters bill are illustrative in this regard.176 The Isakson
bill requires the MFA to be privatized,177 while the Campbell-Peters bill
allows the FHFA to charter new housing finance guaranty associations
(HGFAs).17 8 A comprehensive bill could blend these two proposals so
that the successors to the MFA are chartered as HGFAs, but with a
provision to wind down any explicit government guarantees associated
with the HGFAs, or securities issued by them, over a reasonable period
of time, such as ten years after the HGFAs are first chartered. This
would permit the private mortgage market time to fully heal from the
financial crisis and demonstrate its ability to satisfy the nation's
mortgage finance needs.
Any final legislation should ensure that the future HGFAs and
successors to the MFA are not concentrated in the hands of a few large
financial institutions, and that the future system of securitization
174. See supra Part Ill.C.3.
175. See supra Part 111.C.3.
176. See supra Part III.C.
177. Mortgage Finance Act, S. 1963, 112th Cong. 202 (2011).
178. Housing Finance Reform Act, H.R. 1859, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
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maintains access for smaller, community-based lenders. One way to
ensure this is to create a system of legislatively-sanctioned cooperatives
to offer securitization functions, particularly to small and medium-sized
lenders that would be open to all lenders on an equal access basis.
One additional change to the Isakson bill that may be desirable
is to remove the firm requirement for privatization within ten years and
allow the MFA to determine whether the private market is capable of
functioning and providing sufficient mortgage credit without an explicit
government guarantee.179 The legislation also could include language
that prohibits the MFA from attempting to maximize its market size
even while it is a government instrumentality. Instead, the agency could
be required to operate at all times and in such a manner as to expand
and strengthen the private market for mortgage credit.
In keeping with a general emphasis on reducing the role of
government support for the mortgage market, comprehensive mortgage
finance legislation should also include many of the provisions in
Representative Garrett's legislative proposals.' 80  His proposal to
empower the FHFA to establish underwriting and documentation
standards for private mortgage securitizations is vital in correcting one
of the most glaring flaws in the system existing prior to the financial
crisis.18' The safety, security, and transparency of these standards
cannot be overstated and are important for bringing investor confidence
back into the private securitization market. It is clear that private
securitizations are a necessary source for mortgage credit in order for
the market to regain its footing.
Representative Garrett's proposal to establish a legislative
covered bonds regime is also worthy of further study, but should be
acted upon only after careful review and revision.' 82  Many of the
FDIC's concerns with the bill are worth heeding. In particular, in order
to avoid repeating the errors in the private securitization market, it is
important that covered bonds are held to the same high levels of
underwriting, documentation, and investor and consumer protection as
179. S. 1963 § 202.
180. See supra Part III.D.
181. Private Mortgage Market Investment Act, H.R. 3644, 112th Cong. (2011).
182. See Anna T. Pinedo, Active U.S. Covered Bond Market: Key Role for Housing,
N.Y. L.J., June 20, 2011, available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110620-
Active-US-Covered-Bond-Market-Key-Role-for-Housing.pdf.
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apply to private securitizations under Garrett's other proposal. 183 The
assets underlying covered bonds should also be verified regularly by an
independent third-party for conformity with these underwriting
standards. Finally, further study should be undertaken to determine
whether a healthy covered bond market is more likely to develop under
an explicit legislative regime, or through regulatory guidance and
contractual provisions, in order to avoid granting these securities an
implied government guarantee.
Legislative proposals to allow certain mortgage-backed
securities to be issued without registration with the SEC are also
important to maintain the "to-be-announced" market that allows
borrowers to lock in mortgage rates in advance. It also allows lenders to
hedge risk safely and effectively.1 84  By limiting this exemption to
securities underwritten in conformity with rigorous underwriting,
documentation, and investor protection provisions, policymakers will
aid in focusing the housing market on safer and more sustainable
mortgage credit. This should also reduce the build-up of credit and
other risks that could lead to a repeat of the last financial crisis.
Finally, in addition to developing a path for gradual reduction in
direct government support of the housing market and restarting the
securitization market for mortgage assets, policymakers should explore
proposals for increasing the incentives for financial institutions to retain
mortgage loans on their balance sheets. This should include
strengthening the FHLBank system as well as exploring covered bonds
proposals. This means rejecting two of the proposals in the
Administration's White Paper: (1) limiting access to the FHLBank
system only to smaller financial institutions and (2) limiting the ability
of the FHLBanks to maintain adequate investments to fund the liquidity
necessary to a healthy banking sector. As detailed in a recent Moody's
report, such proposals would inhibit the ability of the FHLBank system
to continue to function effectively and weaken the entire U.S. banking
sector. 85  The Moody's report, along with others,186 supports the
183. See id
184. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A CBO PAPER: EFFECTS OF REPEALING FANNIE MAE'S
AND FREDDIE MAC'S SEC ExEMPTioN 13 (2003).
185. KHRIMIAN & BARZEL, supra note 72.
186. See generally Adam Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank System. The
Lender of Next-to-Last Resort? (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No.
357, Nov. 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr357.html
13 1
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important role the FHLBanks play as a source of liquidity and stability
for the U.S. banking sector.
Banking regulators also should explore changes in capital
regulations to allow more favorable treatment of mortgage bonds,
including both MBS and covered bonds that are underwritten in
accordance with strict government underwriting and monitoring
standards. This should encourage depository institutions to retain more
of the mortgage credit that they originate. Additionally, this may foster
greater diversification in mortgage lending away from the largest banks.
Ultimately, the government may have a much more important role to
play as a regulator of sound mortgage credit, rather than a provider of
such credit.
V. CONCLUSION
No matter what system of housing finance is ultimately adopted
in the U.S., it is vital that policymakers address the long-term structure
soon. Housing continues to be a burden on American consumers and
the country's overall economy. In order for the housing market to begin
its recovery, it needs healthy lending institutions, and a vibrant
secondary market. Permitting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to continue
in a permanent state of conservatorship should not be an option. One
can see in many of the proposals described herein and introduced in
Congress in 2011, the outlines of an omnibus housing finance reform
bill that would positively reshape America's mortgage finance system
on a more stable and sustainable basis. It is up to Congress not to let
partisan gridlock stand in the way of good policy.
(describing the significant role played by the FHLBanks at the onset of the recent financial
crisis).
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